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196]VRRENT DECISIONS
vanced development 17 By holding the contractor liable, the court has,
in effect, made the home purchaser an equal to the chattel purchaser in
the field of vendee's protection. In so doing, the court noted that there
was no meaningful distinction between the mass production and sale of
automobiles and homes, and that the pertinent overriding policy con-
siderations were the same. The court felt that the public interest dictated'
this result and that the ancient legal distinctions that make no sense mi
today's society should be discarded in the law's growth to meet the
changing needs and mores of our contemporary world.'8
ANTHONY GAETA, JR.
Constitutional Law-RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH- Tinker v. Indepen-
dent Comnunity School District, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
Plaintiffs, minor school children, sought to enjoin local school authon-
ties from enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the wearing on school
premises of black armbands in protest of the war in Viet Nam.' The
district court dismissed the complaint, thus upholding the action of the
school authorities, 2 and a divided court of appeals affirmed.3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to consider the question of whether
or not the action of the school authority in this case was a permissible
limitation of the right of free speech guaranteed to citizens of states by
the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Supreme Court, following the holding of the Fifth Circuit in
Burnside v. Byars,5 held that for the school authority to justify the
abridgment of the right to free speech, 6 school officials must be able to
17. The court cited Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A2d 314 (1965)
as authority for its decision. In Schipper, the court held that the builder-vendor was
liable to the purchaser on the basis of strict liability for personal injury. In Kriegler,
the damage was to property. See 51 CoRNF, LL, L. Q. 389 (1966); 41 WASH. L. Rxv. 166
(1966).
18. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
1. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). The ages of the children ranged from thirteen to sixteen;.
their protest was part of an organized group including both adults and children.
2. 258 F Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
3. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
5. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. Id. at 748:
[School officials] cannot infringe upon their students' right to free and
unrestricted expression as guaranteed them under the First Amendment
where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and school rooms
1969]
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show that such limitation was necessary to maintain proper discipline
and decorum 'withm the school, and that the prohibited conduct would
"materially and substantially interfere" with such maintenance of or-
der.7
The Supreme Court, in Tinker, continues the application of basic
principles laid down in Dennis v. United States8 and Cantwell v. Con-
necticu9 where it is apparent that for speech, symbolic or verbal, to be
the proper subject of state abridgment, there must not only be some
"substantial state interest" 10 at stake, but such speech (or conduct
amounting to speech) must inevitably lead to acts adverse to the state
interest sought to be protected. 1 Thus having begun with the premise
that constitutional freedoms may be to some extent qualified,' 2 courts
have preferred to decide on a case by case basis 3 whether a particular
limitation is or is not justifiable.' 4
Moreover, courts have expressed reluctance to interfere in cases in-
volving school regulations, 15 preferring, on the other hand, to allow
local authorities "broad discretion." '6 Interference is felt to be justified
only if fundamental rights are in jeopardy' 7 Laws, it is said, "must
not be such as cast a pale of orthodoxy over the classroom." :1 Thus
does not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.
Burnside also said that the mere presence of the symbol was not enough to warrant
prohibition without some accompanving student misconduct. Id.
7. Id., see also Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F Supp. 947 (C.D.
S.C. 1967).
8. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
9. 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
10. 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.. 296 (1939); Whitney v.
'California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); University
,Comm'n to End War in Viet Nam v. Gunn, 289 F Supp. 469 (D.C. Tex. 1968);
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F Supp. 947 (C.D. S.C. 1967); Davis v.
Firment, 269 F Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967)
11. Brown v. Louisiana, 381 U.S. 131 (1966); see also Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 US. 329 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
12. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939).
13. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968). See
generally Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1128-57 (1968).
14. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1968).
15. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 89 S. Ct. 266 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966).
16. Tinker v. DeMoines Independent Commumty School Dist, 89 S. Ct. at 746 (1969)
(Harlan J., dissenting opinion); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 747-48.
17. Epperson v. Arkansas, 89 S. Ct. 266 (1966).
18. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US. 589 (1967).
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the various tests applied by the courts determine the validity of a school
regulation in terms such as "reasonableness," '9 "necessity," 20 and "arbi-
tranness," 21 based on the presence or absence of a "substantial state
interest." " Finally, as expressed in Burnside2 3 and Tinker,24 prohibited
conduct must be such as "materially and substantially interferes" with
the operation of the school.2 5 A "silent, passive expression of opinion,
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance" 2 6 will not be enough
to justify prohibition. Prior to Tinker, moreover, the burden has been
on the complaining party to show conditions rendering the regulation
invalid.27
The ultimate effect of Tinker is to clearly adopt the Burnszde ra-
tionale, placing the burden of justification squarely upon the regulating
authority.28 Moreover, it is clear that where the authority seeks to out-
law the expression of a particular opinion it must be able to show that
such expression has an inherent tendency to disrupt or that it has actual-
ly led to disruption of school routine.29 In the absence of actual dis-
19. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 748; Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ.,
363 F2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
20. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (C.D. S.C. 1967).
22. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Ci. 1966).
23. What is a reasonable regulation? It is " one which measurably contributes
to the maintenance and decorum within the educational system." id. at 748.
24. Compare Tinker v. DeMomes Independent Community School Dist., 89 S.Ct. 733
(1969) with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
25. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
26. Tinker v. DeMoines Independent School Dist, 89 S. Ct. 733, 737 (1969) with
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. Burnette v. Nix, 244 Ark. 235, 424 S.W.2d 537 (1968). See also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan in Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 738.
28. Tinker v. DeMomes Independent School Dist, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). In order
for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always ac-
company an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly there is no finding and no showing that
the exercise of the forbidden right would "materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibi-
tion cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d at 749; Tinker v. DeMoines
Independent School Dist., 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
29. Tinker v. DeMomes Independent School Dist, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). The armbands
were forbidden, but other forms of symbolic speech were permitted. No disturbance
was attributed to the presence of the armbands; accord, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744
(5th Cir. 1966); see also Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749
(5th Cir. 1966). In this case the regulation singled out a specific opinion, but the
abridgment of the right was upheld because of disturbance directly attributable to
the expression of the opinion.
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turbance causally connected with the expression of an opinion or
opinions, it must be shown that some deleterious effect upon school dis-
cipline will inevitably result.80
Leaving unanswered the question of the degree to which the con-
stitutional rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults, Tinker
continues the application of the Burnside rule, clearly emphasizing the
shift in the burden of proving the constitutional validity of a chal-
lenged regulation to the promulgating authority
TERRY B. LIGHT
30. "[B]ut, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension or disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." 89 S. Ct. at 737. The con-
clusion of the Court would seem to be that in the absence of an obvious inherent
tendency to disrupt, it must be shown that the proscribed conduct actually caused
some disturbance.
[Vol. 11.26.1
